Epistemic Uniqueness

My friend Joel wrote about a possible counter-example to Epistemic Uniqueness.

“Epistemic Uniqueness: for any body of evidence, E, and any proposition, P, E permits at most one rational attitude toward P (i.e., given E, it is either rational to believe P, disbelieve P, or suspend judgment about P, but not more than one). ” (http://joelballivian.blogspot.com/2017/03/a-counterexample-to-epistemic-uniqueness.html)

I commented on why I thought the counter-example he gave failed. But as I was reflecting on some different today, I thought there might be a counter-example. Person S is aware of all the different theories of T for Y because they are an expert in T. They have assigned probabilities of each T: A: 5%, B: 10%, C:15%, and D: 45%. There are no other theories which are above 1%. It seems that person S is justified in both believing D and suspending judgment about D. Since, P(D)>P(C+B+A), but Pr(D) is still under 50%. It is the most likely, yet not likely at the same time. It seems pragmatically one would believe D, but also keep wondering if D was true. In addition, I think it likely that there are epistemologists who fit this scenario in the structure of knowledge debate.

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